T he research designs used by our quantitative colleagues are usually focused on measurement and are meticulously organized around notions of equivalence. Samples are randomly drawn, so that repeated sampling will produce similar samples; interventions are planned with extraordinary care, so that the experimental conditions are standardized, and the criterion for valid experimentation is replication of results. Instrumentation is also always standardized, so that whenever possible, conditions and context are replicated as much as possible. The key is comparison: They compare to ensure that things are the same, or compare to see if there are changes and the two formerly equivalent groups are now different.
In contrast, qualitative inquiry appears downright sloppy. We are unabashedly unconcerned with replication, arguing that contexts change; our samples are eclectic and, apparently, biased; our instrumentation is ourselves, subjective to the extreme. We argue that measurement is not pertinent and that that we are intent on eliciting meaning.
Yet, ironically, comparison is also critical to our research. All description requires comparison: "This is the same as (or different from) that." Ethnography, for example, is often based on the comparison of two cultural groups, and when a single group is used, the researcher often implicitly uses his or her own culture to provide a comparative perspective. Grounded theorists examine developments and change, comparing the before/previous with the after/present. We compare data line by line, forming categories or themes, identifying concepts, and comparing those with other concepts and with the work of others. Our strategy of decontextualizing strips the pertinent from the context-bound extraneous, sorting the theoretically significant from the contextual baggage.
If we are comparing two types of the same class of phenomenon, this process is apparently easy. For instance, we can sort two types of apples by color (the red and the green) or by taste (the crabapple and the Delicious). But if we have an orange and a bad apple in our category, we must then decide if they really belong (as a negative case) or if they are not a part of our sample and should therefore be discarded.
Note that the negative case is an example that has some of the characteristics of the class but differs on a number of significant dimensions. It is not the absence of a characteristic between our single case and those in our developing category, for that makes the characteristic one of "seeing nobody on the road." The variation in our bad apple's flesh-brown and rotten, rather than white and crisp-provides us with an insight about apples (good vs. bad) only when we saturate each type. The difference with the flesh of an orange (and the smell, quality of the juice, seeds, skins, and so forth) allows us to include the orange only if we have labeled our category as fruit. If we saturated our oranges category, we could find many oranges different on enough dimensions that they could then emerge, forming their own group.
An important methodological question in the emerging quandary of "What is comparison?" that occurs when characteristics of one group are discarded as context bound and when we can identify negative cases is seeking equivalence in our methods. But in qualitative inquiry, it becomes very complex. Suppose we are exploring apples and oranges using different qualitative strategies to examine each group. For instance, one group of researchers might be examining apples using observational methods, and our other data set was obtained by taste and smell. Can these two perspectives provide us with comparative data?
We frequently see such designs published. One researcher, for instance, who is interested in the patient's experience of the emergency room, interviews patients who have been discharged about their experiences, conducts focus groups with another group of relatives, and conducts participant observations of caregiving in the setting itself with different patients. At one level, provided we have paid attention to the adequacy and appropriateness of sampling, these three data sets should fit together to inform us about the research topic and provide us with richer description than one data set alone. But how far can these diverse data sets be considered comparatively, before we fall into the "nobody on the road" trap?
Clearly, such comparisons are easier if all the data sets are of the same type (all unstructured interviews, for instance). Not infrequently, however, the data sets being compared are all interviews but different types of interviews, perhaps some unstructured and some from focus groups. This will provide us with intimate and storied data from the unstructured interviews, and "public face" and less detailed data from the focus groups. Can such data sets be combined? Yes, but cautiously. The qualitative iterative designs allow for returning to participants for additional information or modifying our questions if we identify something in one data set but not in another; if, for instance, one group can see the person and the second an insignificant speck on the road.
Comparison using soft, uncontrolled research designs requires a different set of skills than those used by our quantitative colleagues. But our comparisons require equal care, attention to detail, and wisdom within our analytic processes. The difference is that a zero or an N/A or an absence in one qualitative data set is often likely to be a totally irrelevant characteristic, for rarely are the things we study so clear-cut that one category might be filled and there will be no trace of the characteristic in a second data set. Although we cannot control for absences, we must also appreciate that our comparisons are not often dichotomous, life is usually on a continuum, and to determine equivalences, we must also consider the data source for appropriateness and fit.
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